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At Issue 
First Amendment 
What content restrictions can Congress place on NEA grants? 
New York artist Karen Finley became 
briefly famous last year as the recipient of a 
National Endowment for the Humanities grant 
for work that includes smearing her nude body 
with chocolate and uttering statements like "God 
is death." 
Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds is 
more moderate, arguing that Congress can 
impose restrictions on NEA funding, but only 
subject to constitutional limits. 
The real problem, says Rodney A Smolla, a 
law professor at the College of William and Mary, 
is knowing where to stop. Smolla fears a chilling 
effect could result from legislators acting as art 
critics. 
Enough, say conservatives, who believe the 
government has no business subsidizing what 
they consider offensive art. Former Assistant 
A Hot Potato for Congress 
BY WILLIAM BRADFORD 
REYNOLDS 
As we move this year into a new 
round ofbudget talks, the debate on 
federal appropriations to fund art-
ists whose work some consider inde-
cent is bound to resurface. 
With a daunting deficit gap, 
billions needed to pay for the Desert 
Storm operation, an S&L bailout 
fiasco that grows worse by the 
minute, and sympathy apparently 
building on the Hill to subsidize the 
D.C. government to the tune of some 
$100 million, we can expect some to 
question whether the National En-
dowment for the Humanities should 
receive any federal dollars this year. 
Mter all, creative artistry has 
never been know to spring from 
federal subsidies; nor has it been 
stifled by the lack of government 
largesse. Moreover, defunding NEA 
altogether raises no First Amend-
ment concerns. 
Nonetheless, a total cut-off of 
federal funds seems unlikely. Con-
gress probably will vote to continue 
a government subsidy for the arts, 
but in a reduced amount. 
That, too, presents no First 
Amendment difficulties, as seems 
clear from the Supreme Court's 
decision not long ago in Regan v. 
Taxation Without Representation, 
461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
Such a funding reduction will 
mean that some NEA grants cannot 
be renewed. Even so, the termi-
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nated recipients remain free to ex-
press themselves artistically, every 
bit as uninhibited by government 
regulations as those artists who 
never received an NEA subsidy. 
I st Amendment Boundaries 
This does not suggest that the 
NEA can be wholly indifferent to 
the First Amendment. A grant of 
federal money made to advance one 
religious belief over others would 
likely run afoul of the establishment 
clause,just as an NEA award driven 
by an overt hostility to a particular 
religion introduces similar constitu-
tional problems under the free exer-
cise clause. 
While the funding of artwork 
that portrays offensively prejudicial 
messages reflecting racial or relig-
ious bias has free speech protection, 
openly discriminatory award deci-
sions bottomed on race, gender or 
ethnic background are constitution-
ally suspect. 
To refine constitutional guide-
lines even further, Congress confi-
dently can direct the NEA not to use 
any of its grant money to fund 
"obscene" art so long as it makes 
clear that the obscenity prohibition 
is tied to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion on obscenity in Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
There, the Court announced 
that works that appeal to the pruri-
ent interests of the average person, 
depict in a patently offensive man-
ner sexual organs or acts, and lack 
serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value enjoy no First Amend-
ment protection. 
Similarly, child pornography 
can be congressionally excluded from 
NEA grant awards, since it is con-
stitutionally proscribed in Ferber v. 
New York, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
Somewhat less clear is what 
funding constraints can be imposed 
on art that is generally considered 
to be "indecent." 
In most instances, indecent ex-
pression (that which does not con-
form with accepted standards of 
morality) escapes government con-
demnation out of an abiding defer-
ence to the First Amendment. 
Where, however, the vulgar 
utterances are used in a public 
forum-on radio or television, for 
example-during hours when young 
children are likely to be in the 
audience, the privilege would be 
decidedly less. 
While it would appear to be 
constitutionally imprudent for Con-
gress to impose restrictions on the 
subsidizing of indecent art, cer-
tainly it could direct the NEA to shy 
away from funding art programs 
and performances regarded as inde-
cent if they are aimed at, or likely to 
reach, youthful audiences. 
To suggest such legislative guid-
ance for grant awards by the NEA 
threatens neither artistic creativity 
nor First Amendment values. The 
failure to insist on such constraints 
leaves both vulnerable. • 
BY RODNEY A. SMOLLA 
Much of the recent attack on 
the National Endowment for the 
Arts proceeds from the premise that 
the government may attach any 
conditions it pleases on artistic fund-
ing, because it is merely engaging in 
decisions over how to spend scarce 
resources. A refusal to fund art, the 
argument goes, is not to censor it. 
There may be a constitutional right 
to paint an offensive painting, but 
no constitutional right to paint it 
with public funds. 
An analogy is drawn to deci-
sions in other areas of constitu-
tional law, such as abortion, where 
the Supreme Court has distinguished 
between negative restrictions on the 
exercise of a right and affirmative 
obligations to fund its exercise. 
In the context of arts funding, 
this argument is specious. It is 
nothing more than an attempt to 
resurrect the long-discredited "right-
privilege" distinction- that the art-
ist's receipt of public funds is a mere 
"privilege." Under this view the 
govemment is in the same position 
as any private benefactor. 
For over 40 years, however, the 
Supreme Court has rejected this 
view. In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593 (1972), it held that while 
the government may deny benefits 
for any number of reasons, decisions 
that infringe on constitutionally pro-
tected rights-especially free speech-
are impermissible. 
IllUSTRATION BY TIM TEEBKEN 
Block That Agenda 
The principle articulated in 
Perry is often misunderstood. It 
does not mean that government 
may never attach any content-based 
conditions to the receipt of grant 
funds. Evaluations of artistic merit 
are inevitable. The real puzzle is 
how to determine what content-
based restrictions are to be permit-
ted, and what not. 
One should first dispose of a 
pet argument of the NEA's detrac-
tors, who make much of the fact that 
govemment should not be forced to 
fund obscene art. But this point is 
irrelevant-of course there is no 
First Amendment obligation to fund 
obscenity, any more than there is a 
First Amendment obligation to fund 
speech presenting a clear and pre-
sent danger of violence. 
And virtually everyone would 
agree that restrictions that violate 
equal protection principles-distinc-
tions based on the identity of speak-
ers-cannot be valid. 
There is no obligation to create 
an NEA at all, but we could never 
tolerate an NEA that gave grants to 
whites but not blacks, or Catholics 
but not Jews, or Democrats but not 
Republicans. 
An Equality Principle 
But the First Amendment has 
an equality principle that spins on 
its own gyroscope, separate and 
distinct from the equal protection 
clause, that also forbids discrimi-
nation based on the speaker's mes-
sage. The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held that "viewpoint dis-
crimination'' is unconstitutional, even 
when govemment is merely doling 
out public funds, and not exercising 
direct censorship. 
And so the debate has been 
honed to a dispute over what is 
meant by ''viewpoint discrimina-
tion." The dispute is narrow, but 
everything hangs on it. 
The "conservative" interpreta-
tion treats it as akin to the concept 
of "purposeful discrimination." Just 
as proof of intent is necessary to 
support an equal protection claim of 
race or sex discrimination, there 
:r,nust be proof of intent by officials to 
suppress a particular idea in order 
to support a First Amendment claim 
of viewpoint discrimination. 
This view fails to provide ade-
quate protection for freedom of 
speech, however, because it does not 
ferret out surreptitious and subtle 
forms of discrimination. The better 
interpretation puts the onus on the 
govemment to justify any content-
based classification. 
Because we should constantly 
fear viewpoint discrimination mas-
querading as neutrality, content-
based regulation of speech should 
be regarded as presumptively sus-
pect. We should be particularly sus-
picious when political bodies at-
tempt to micro-manage speech deci-
sions that have traditionally been 
left to the sound discretion of profes-
sionals in the field. • 
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